Abstract. In this paper, we propose a definition of Edgeworth equilibrium for a private ownership production economy with (possibly infinitely) many private goods and a finite number of pure public goods. We show that Edgeworth equilibria exist whatever be the dimension of the private goods space and can be decentralized, in the finite and infinite dimensional cases, as Lindahl-Foley equilibria. Existence theorems for Lindahl-Foley equilibria are a by-product of our results.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider a private ownership production economy with (possibly infinitely) many private goods and a finite number of pure public goods. Finitely many households have an initial endowment of private goods and jointly consume private goods and a same amount of public goods; this amount of public goods is jointly produced with private goods by finitely many competitive firms.
In such a model, financing the production of public goods can be thought of in two different ways. Either, following Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2001) , households are supposed to make voluntary purchases (or privately provide amounts) of public goods, determining the total provision of public goods entering in the utility function of each household. The economic meaning of this approach is justified by the existence of private donations to charity and many other examples where a public good is provided in a market without government involvement. Or, in a Lindahlian approach, households are allowed to pay for the total amount of public goods a personalized price, the sum of personalized prices determining the public good vector price used by the competitive firms. As long as no equilibrium concept is defined, both formalizations are obviously equivalent. In counterpart, two different equilibrium concepts can be defined which differ by the optimization problem solved This version of the paper was prepared during reciprocal visits of E. L. del Mercato to CERMSEM and of M. Florenzano to DIMAD, University of Florence. The hospitality of both institutions is gratefully acknowledged. It has benefitted from discussions with the members of these research centers. Presented at a seminar of the Department of Economics of the University of Naples, at the 13th European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory in Venice (2004) , at the PET04 Conference in Peking (2004) , it has also benefitted from the comments of these audiences. Special thanks go to N. Allouch and V. Iehlé for remarks on previous drafts of this paper.
by households at equilibrium. In the classical line of general equilibrium with preferences depending on the consumption of the other consumers, households may be assumed to take their own provision decision taking as given not only the market prices but also the provision decisions of the other households. Then prices, individual consumptions of private goods and individual provisions of public goods arise from the competitive functioning of the productive system and the market clearing. This is the equilibrium concept studied by Zenginobuz (2001, 2003) . Such an equilibrium can easily be shown to be constrained optimal (for an optimality notion where the choices of each household are constrained by the choices of the other households). It has no reason to be Pareto optimal, for the optimality notion commonly adopted in a public good framework and that we use in this paper. On the other hand, in the line of Foley (1970) , households may be assumed to consume private goods and to claim an amount of public goods taking as given the private good prices and their personalized vector of public good prices. Then, personalized prices and the equilibrium allocation arise from the competitive functioning of the productive system and the market clearing. As shown by Foley in the case of a convex and constant returns technology, such an equilibrium is optimal for the optimality notion corresponding to the public good framework, and belongs to the core of the economy.
Coherent with this definition of optimality, the main result of this paper is the definition and existence of Edgeworth equilibria for our economy. Since prices are not involved in optimality, core and limit-core concepts, we adapt the classical definitions to the public good model in the Villanacci-Zenginobuz framework that we set in Section 2. This adaptation, done in Section 3, is not trivial. In particular, the definition of blocking for coalitions of replica economies requires some caution. It is known (see for example Conley 1994 ) that if blocking is defined in replica economies as it is defined for coalitions of the original economy, then the core of a public goods economy may not converge as the economy gets large. Our concept of blocking in replica economies is justified by the consideration of the aspects of crowding and congestion. The idea is that for most of public goods, the appreciation we have is dependent on the "size" of the group of consumers of the same type in the coalition (see Section 4 of Milleron 1972 who suggests the idea, see Section 2 of Vasil'ev 1994-96, and Vasil'ev, Weber and Wiesmeth 1995 who focus on the equivalence theorem). Non-emptiness of the core and, with the definition of blocking we propose for replica economies, existence of Edgeworth equilibria for a convex economy with private provision of public goods are shown in Section 4 under some classical assumptions on the model. Since we work with utility functions, we prove the non-emptiness of the core using Scarf's theorem (actually, an extension of Scarf's theorem). The existence of Edgeworth equilibria is classically proved using compactness arguments.
We then look for decentralization with prices of an Edgeworth equilibrium allocation so as to get at least a quasiequilibrium of the model. It appears that the equilibrium concept adapted to our concept of Edgeworth equilibrium is that of Lindahl-Foley equilibrium that we precisely define in Section 5. As known since Foley (1970) and Milleron (1972) , this equilibrium can be seen as the equilibrium of an economy with only private goods defined on an enlarged commodity space. We follow this strategy and study the correspondence between optimality, core and limit-core concepts in the economy with public goods and the usual corresponding concepts in the enlarged economy. Decentralization in the public good economy is then driven by known results of decentralization in the enlarged economy. This decentralization is studied first in a finite dimensional setting. Existence theorems for Lindahl-Foley equilibrium are a by-product of our two results of existence of Edgeworth equilibria and of their decentralization as Lindahl-Foley equilibria. Equivalence and existence theorems for Lindahl-Foley equilibria are obtained under weaker assumptions than in the literature. When, in order to model time and uncertainty, the private commodity space is assumed to be infinite dimensional, the same results involve structural assumptions on the commodity-price duality of the model and properness assumptions borrowed from Tourky (1998 Tourky ( , 1999 .
To end, it is worth noticing that our results strongly rely on the convexity assumptions made in particular on the production of public goods. The private production of public goods, and the related convexity assumptions, distinguish our model from a different approach to the pure theory of public goods, initiated by Mas-Colell (1980) and studied by Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989) , Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) , Diamantaras and Gilles (1996), De Simone and Graziano (2004) , where aside a convex private ownership economy there is a set (with or without linear structure) of public projects each one characterized by a cost in terms of private goods. These authors develop a notion of valuation equilibrium in which the public project is financed through a nonlinear system of personalized prices called valuation system, and they show the first and second welfare theorems. As pointed out by Mas-Colell (1980) , when the set of public projects has a linear structure and the valuation system is restricted to be linear homogeneous, then the concept of a valuation equilibrium coincides with the concept of (valuation) Lindahl equilibrium. Moreover, with only one private good, as shown by Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989) , a Lindahl-Foley equilibrium is a particular case of valuation equilibrium (called linear cost share equilibrium). If in addition, the cost function is convex, proving the existence of Edgeworth equilibria that we decentralize as Lindahl-Foley equilibria, we go further than these authors. But the main interest of their approach is precisely to deal with the nonlinear and nonconvex cases.
The model
We consider a production economy with a (possibly infinite dimensional) private commodity space L and private provisions of a finite number K of public goods
• L, L ′ is a pair of vector spaces and an associated bilinear functional ·, · that separates points, so that L × R K , L ′ × R K represents the commodity-price duality of the model. As usual, we will denote by (p,
We assume moreover that L is a partially ordered vector space, while R K is canonically ordered. In the case of a finite number of private goods, L is some Euclidean space R C , which will be equipped with its canonical topology, and L ′ is identified with R C .
• There is a finite set H of households. Each household h has the positive cone X h = L + ×R K + of the commodity space as choice set and an initial endowment e h = (ω h , 0) ∈ L + × {0}, that is, no initial endowment in public goods. For a generic element (
the private commodity consumption of household h, while the components of the vector x g h ∈ R K + denote the amount of each public good that household h provides. Household h's preferences depend on the provision of public goods of the other agents and are represented by a utility function u h :
defined over his consumption of private goods and the total provision of public goods G =
• There is a finite set F of firms which jointly produce private and public goods. Each firm is characterized by a production set
• For every firm f and each household h, the firm shares 0 ≤ θ h,f ≤ 1 classically represent a contractual claim of household h on the profit of firm f when it faces a price (
In a core and Edgeworth equilibrium approach, the relative shares θ h,f reflect household's stock holdings which represent proprietorships of production possibilities and θ h,f Y f is interpreted as a technology set at h's disposal in Y f . As usual, h∈H θ h,f = 1, for each f .
Let ω denote the total endowment of private goods, that is, h∈H e h = (ω, 0). An allocation is a t-uple (
By abuse of language, we speak of (x h , x g h ) h∈H as a consumption allocation when we should speak of a consumers' choice allocation.
As usual, A(E) denotes the set of feasible allocations. Using the appropriate projections of this set on (
respectively denote the set of feasible consumption allocations, and the feasible choice sets for each household and each firm. Let σ be a topology on L non necessarily compatible with the duality L, L ′ and let τ R K denote the canonical topology on R K . We will maintain in the whole paper the following set of minimal assumptions on the economy E called in the sequel standard assumptions:
• u h is quasi-concave and monotone with respect to public goods, that is, for every
In A1, the first assumption on each X h and e h is constitutive of the model. Monotonicity of utilities with respect to public goods ("No public bads") will play a decisive role in our proofs. In A2, the first assumption on each Y f is constitutive of the model. Free disposal of public goods is assumed in the second part of A2. If the dual pair L, L ′ is a symmetric Riesz dual system
. This is proved in Proposition 4.1 of Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1987) for a private ownership economy and easily adapted to our model of public good economy.
3. Optimality, core and limit-core concepts
The purpose of this section is to give a series of definitions that adapt to the previous model the standard optimality, core and limit-core concepts usually defined for a private ownership production economy with only private goods.
Definition 3.1. A feasible consumption allocation (x h , x g h ) h∈H ∈ X is said to be weakly Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible consumption allocation (
Definition 3.2. Let S ⊂ H, S = be a coalition.
(
(2) The coalition S improves upon or blocks a feasible consumption allocation (
h . G and G S can be thought of as the respective amounts of public goods entering as arguments in the utility function of each member of the coalition S depending on his non-participation or his participation in the coalition. Thus, an interpretation of the previous definition is the following: a coalition S blocks the feasible pair (x h ) h∈H , G if its members can consume some amount of private goods (x h ) h∈S and claim some amount of public goods G S that they unanimously prefer and can afford using their own resources. We will alternatively say that the coalition S blocks or improves upon the feasible pair (x h ) h∈H , G with the S-feasible pair (x h ) h∈S , G S .
Definition 3.3. The core C (E) of the economy E is defined as the set of all feasible consumption allocations (alternatively, the set of all feasible pairs) of E that no coalition can improve upon.
We now continue with the replication concepts adapted to our model. Definition 3.4. Let n be any positive integer. The n-fold replica of E is an economy composed of n subeconomies identical to the original one
with the following characteristics:
• The economy E n has the same commodity-price duality
• For each f ∈ F , n firms, each one indexed by (f, t) (t = 1, . . . , n), have the same production set:
• For ownership of initial holdings and production possibilities, each household (h, s) is a copy of h, but restricted within his subeconomy: 2 θ h,s,f,t is defined by
• The definition of consumers' preferences is specific of an economy with public goods. For a consumer (h, s), the utility associated with a choice (x h,s , x g h,s ) is the utility
corresponding to the private commodity consumption x h,s and the mean of the aggregate public good provision in the whole economy. Such a definition is quite similar to the one proposed by Vasil'ev (1994-96) , justified by the idea that for most of public goods, the appreciation we have about their "size" is dependent on the size of the economy we are talking about (see Milleron 1972) . For the same consumer (h, s), considered as belonging to a coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n}, the utility associated with the same choice (x h,s , x g h,s ) is the mean of the aggregate public good provision in the coalition over the number of consumers of type h in this coalition, that is
where T (h) := {s ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (h, s) ∈ T } and |T (h)| denotes the number of elements of T (h). In other words, the appreciation of a consumer of type h about the provision of public goods is now dependent on the size of the group of consumers of his type in the coalition.
According to this definition, blocking in replica economies is defined as follows:
In other words, a coalition T blocks the feasible (x h,s , x g h,s ) (h,s)∈H×{1,...,n} if its members can consume some amount of private goods (x h,s ) (h,s)∈T and claim some weighted amount of public goods that they unanimously prefer and can afford using their own resources.
In relation (3.1), define
2 This definition is coherent with the definitions given by Burkinshaw (1987) or Florenzano (1990) .
Definition 3.6. The core C (E n ) is the set of all feasible allocations (alternatively, the set of all feasible pairs) of E n which are blocked by no coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n}.
Finally, let (x h , x g h ) h∈H be a feasible consumption allocation of E. Then, for any positive integer n, we can define for each household (h, s) ∈ H × {1, ..., n}, x h,s = x h and x g h,s = x g h . It is easy to see that the consumption allocation so obtained
is a feasible consumption allocation of E n , called n-equal treatment allocation in E n because it gives the same choice (x h , x g h ) to each of the n consumers of type h. Definition 3.7. For each integer n ≥ 1, C n (E) is the set of all feasible consumption allocations of E such that the corresponding n-equal treatment consumption allocation of E n belongs to C (E n ).
We are now ready to give the definition of Edgeworth equilibria of E.
) is said to be an Edgeworth equilibrium of E whenever the corresponding n-equal treatment consumption allocation, that is, its n-replica, belongs to C (E n ) for every n-fold replica economy E n of E. We denote by C E (E) the set of the Edgeworth equilibria of E.
One easily verifies that for every n, C n+1 (E) ⊂ C n (E) and thus that
The non-emptiness of C E (E) under the standard assumptions on E is proved in the next section.
Non-emptiness theorems
When preferences are represented by utility functions, existence of Edgeworth equilibria is based on the celebrated Theorem 1 of Scarf (1967) on the non-emptiness of the core of a balanced game. In an infinite dimensional setting, that is the strategy followed by Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1987) for a private ownership production economy, by Allouch and Florenzano (2004) for an arbitrage-free exchange economy. We will adapt here Allouch-Florenzano's strategy to our production economy with private provisions of pure public goods. One can find in the PhD thesis of del Mercato (2004) , with a different notion of Edgeworth equilibrium and under the assumption that the commodity-space duality L, L ′ is a symmetric Riesz dual system, an adaptation of Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw's strategy to our public good economy. Monotonicity of utility functions with respect to private and public goods plays a decisive role in this adaptation.
Actually, we will use an extension of Scarf's theorem to finite fuzzy games. Before recalling its statement, we need to introduce some notation. Let M = {1, . . . , m} be a finite set of players and
of rates of participation to the coalition t for the different players. We are interested in finite subsets T of T M containing the vector 1 = (1, . . . , 1) of rates of participation to the grand coalition and the canonical base (e i ) of R m , each e i being the vector of rates of participation to the coalition {i}. A nonempty-valued correspondence V : T → R m defines a fuzzy game (T , V ). The fuzzy core C(T , V ) of the m-person fuzzy game (T , V ) is defined as the set
The m-person fuzzy game (T , V ) is said to be balanced whenever for every λ ∈ △ T , {t∈T : λt>0}
The following theorem, proved in Allouch and Florenzano (2004) , extends Scarf's theorem as stated by Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1989) .
Theorem 4.1. If T is as above and if
Coming back to our model, let
Letting G = h∈H x g h , one can also write with some abuse of language:
Noticing that inaction is possible (Assumptions A1 and A2), this set can be thought of as the set of vectors of feasible and individually rational utilities. To each coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n} of the n-replica economy E n of E is associated a vector of rates of participation belonging to the set T n = {t = (t h ) h∈H : nt h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, ∀h ∈ H} .
We will denote by 1 the vector of rates of participation to the grand coalition H. The h-th vector of the canonical base of R H , e h , is the vector of rates of participation to the coalition {h} containing the only one participant h.
For each t ∈ T n , letting supp t = {h ∈ H : t h > 0}, we define successively:
It easily follows from Assumptions A1 and A3 that U is compact. Also, each X e h ⊂ X h is relatively (σ × τ R K ) H -compact, so that it also follows from Assumption A1 that U e h is relatively compact.
Thus there exists c > max
We will apply Theorem 4.1 to the fuzzy game (T n , V c ).
Proposition 4.1. Under the standard assumptions on E, for every integer n ≥ 1 the fuzzy core
Proof. By construction, the fuzzy game (T n , V c ) verifies the conditions a, b, c, d of Theorem 4.1. It suffices to verify that the fuzzy game (T n , V c ) is balanced. To this end, let λ ∈ △ Tn and v ∈ {t∈Tn : λt>0} V c (t). For each integer ν and for every t ∈ T n such that λ t > 0, there exists
Using the definition of △ Tn and the convexity of each production set Y f , one has:
On the other hand, notice that for each h ∈ H,
It then follows from the monotonicity with respects to public goods and the quasiconcavity of each u h and the definition of
Recalling that U is compact and passing to a subsequence if necessary, we get that for some (x h ) h∈H , G ∈ X and for each h ∈ H,
(1), which shows that the fuzzy game (T n , V c ) is balanced and that C(T n , V c ) = .
To prove the last assertion,
, in contradiction with v ∈ C(T n , V c ). We now prove by contraposition that v ∈ C(T n , V ). Let us assume on the contrary that there exist t ∈ T n and u ∈ V (t) such that v h < u h , ∀h ∈ supp t. We have v h < u h ∀h ∈ supp t and u h (ω h , 0) ≤ v h < c ∀h ∈ H. Let λ > 0 be such that
Proposition 4.2. Under the standard assumptions on E,
Proof. Let us first show that
∈ C(T n , V ), then there exist t ∈ T n and u ∈ V (t) such that v h < u h ∀h ∈ supp t. For ν large enough, v ν h < u h ∀h ∈ supp t, a contradiction. To end the proof, in view of the compactness of U, it suffices to prove that for each integer n ≥ 1,
, there exist t ∈ T n and u ∈ V (t) such that v h < u h ∀h ∈ supp t. Let us consider
, we have got a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.2. Under the standard assumptions on E, the set C E (E) of Edgeworth equilibria of E is non-empty.
Proof. Let v ∈ n≥1 C(T n , V ). As already noticed, v ∈ U and there exists (x h ) h∈H , G ∈ X such that for each h ∈ H, u h (ω h , 0) ≤ v h ≤ u h (x h , G). We claim that (x h ) h∈H , G ∈ C E (E). Assume on the contrary, that for some n ≥ 1, (x h ) h∈H , G / ∈ C n (E). Coming back to Definitions 3.5 and 3.7, there exist T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n} and (x h,s , x g h,s ) (h,s)∈T satisfying relations (3.1) and (3.2). Let G T = (h,s)∈T x h,s be the aggregate amount of provisions of public goods by the members of T and
Letting for each h : T (h) = and for each
), relations (3.1) and (3.2) can easily be rewritten:
where, in view of the convexity of Y f , each (y f , y g f ) ∈ Y f , and, using the quasi-concavity of each
Relations (4.1) and (4.2) show that v / ∈ C(T n , V ), a contradiction.
Remark 4.3. It is worth noticing that, at this stage, the private provisions which sum to G in the pair (x h ) h∈H , G do not need to be precise. In the next section, we will determine the private provisions which sum to G when the Edgeworth equilibrium pair (x h ) h∈H , G is decentralized as the consumption component of a Lindahl-Foley equilibrium.
Decentralizing Edgeworth equilibria as Lindahl-Foley equilibria
Let us first introduce the following equilibrium definition.
Definition 5.1. A Lindahl-Foley equilibrium of E is a t-uple
such that:
(1) for every f ∈ F , for every (y f , y
If, in the previous definition, we set x g h = t h G, then each x g h can be thought of as h's provision of public goods and condition 3 in the previous definition means that the allocation Milleron 1972 , Section 3) of Lindahl-Foley equilibrium. Then in both cases, Condition 1 means that each firm maximizes its profit taking as given the common vector price (p, p g ). Condition 2 means that each consumer chooses a consumption of private goods and claims a total amount of public goods, so as to maximize his utility function taking as given the common price of private goods and his personalized price of public goods (equivalently, the relative part of public goods he accepts to provide). Equilibrium is characterized by feasibility of the allocation and a unanimous consent on the amount of public goods to be produced.
It is worth noticing that the equilibrium definition 5.1 dramatically differs by the setting of household h's optimization problem from the more classical general equilibrium concept studied in Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2001) where, for a common vector price (p, p g ), each household is assumed to choose his provision of public goods so as to maximize his utility function, taking as given the provisions of public goods of the other agents.
3 In contrast with results of Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2003) , it simply follows from the definitions that a Lindahl-Foley equilibrium of E is Pareto optimal, belongs to the core and is an Edgeworth equilibrium, for the optimality and core notions defined in Section 3. The purpose of this section is to prove converse results. More 3 Identifying consumption and provision of public goods, a careful reader will notice that the VillanacciZenginobuz equilibrium can be analyzed as a general equilibrium of a production economy where, as in Florenzano (1990) , preferences of the agents depend on the consumptions of the other agents.
precisely, it is to associate with an Edgeworth equilibrium of E private good prices and personalized public good prices so as to get a Lindahl-Foley equilibrium.
Definition of an associated economy E
′ with only private commodities. Following Foley (1970) and Milleron (1972) , we now define an economy E ′ with only private commodities such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the feasible allocations in this economy and the feasible Lindahl-Foley allocations in the original model E.
We first extend the commodity space by considering each consumer's bundle of public goods as a separate group of commodities. The consumption set of consumer h is then extended by writing for all public good components not corresponding to the hth component hypothetic bundles of public goods G h ′ ,h which do not enter as arguments in the utility function of h:
) , Production sets, initial endowments and utility functions are defined as follows:
The relations between weakly Pareto optimal, core and Edgeworth (feasible) Lindahl-Foley allocations of E as defined in Section 3 on one hand, and on the other hand, weakly Pareto optimal, core and Edgeworth equilibrium allocations of E ′ , as usually defined, are summarized in the next proposition. Its proof is straightforward, if one cautiously overcomes notational difficulties. The results strongly rely on the assumption of monotonicity of utility functions with respect to public goods.
Proposition 5.1. Under the standard assumptions on E, we have the following:
, that we will call in the sequel the corresponding (x
Proof. To prove a., let us assume that for some S ⊂ H and for some (y f , y
Then,
by definition of Y ′ f . Assume conversely that for some S ⊂ H and for some (y f , y
To prove c. and d., consider a feasible allocation (x h ) h∈H , G in E and the corresponding allocation (x
It also follows from a. and the monotonicity of the u h with respect to public goods that for each h ∈ S,
To prove e., according to the definition of replica economies of private ownership production economies with private goods,
T is a T -feasible pair satisfying (3.1) and (3.2) of Definition 3.5. Then, letting for each (h,
, one has:
To prove f., consider now a feasible allocation (x h ) h∈H , G in E, the corresponding allocation (x ′ h ) h∈H in E ′ and assume that the coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n} blocks the n-replica of (x
With the previous definitions and notations, the pair
T is T -feasible. On the other hand, one has for each (h, s) ∈ T , u h (x h,s , G h,h,s ) > u h (x h , G). It follows from the quasiconcavity of utility functions that for each h : T (h) = ,
and from e. and the monotonicity of u h with respect to public goods that
This proves that the coalition T blocks in E n the n-replica of (x h ) h∈H , G with the T -feasible pair ( x h ) (h,s)∈T , G
T . The last assertion of f. is now obvious.
In the sequel, we start with an Edgeworth equilibrium (x h ) h∈H , G as obtained in Theorem 4.2 and show how to decentralize it as a Lindahl-Foley equilibrium of E with prices in
With the allocation (x h ) h∈H , G , (y f , y g f ) f ∈F , we will associate a nonzero price vector
, this quasiequilibrium will be called non-trivial.
From now on, we set on E the following additional assumptions:
A4: If (x h ) h∈H , G is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E, each utility function u h is lower semicontinuous at (x h , G). A5: If (x h ) h∈H , G is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E, then for each
A.6: If (x h ) h∈H , G is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E, then there exists Proof. As shown in Proposition 5.1, the allocation (x
and is an Edgeworth equilibrium consumption allocation of E ′ that we will decentralize with a nonzero price as a quasiequilibrium allocation of E ′ . From Assumptions A4 and A5, we easily deduce local non-satiation of preferences in E ′ at each component x h , (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0) and openness in each
H of preferred sets
It then follows from the classical result of decentralization in private ownership economies with private goods that there exists π = p, (p
′ with a nonzero quasiequilibrium price.
The previous relations imply:
Remark 5.3. Several irreducibility conditions guarantee that a non-trivial quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium. A very simple condition, inspired by Arrow and Hahn (1971) , is the following:
IR: For any non-trivial partition {H 1 , H 2 } of the set H of consumers and for any feasible allocation (
, with a strict inequality for at least one h of H 1 ;
We leave the reader to verify that the non-trivial quasiequilibrium is then an equilibrium.
The obvious interpretation of this condition is that for any partition {H 1 , H 2 } of the set of consumers into two nonempty subgroups and for each feasible allocation the group H 1 may be moved to a preferred position, feasible with a new vector of total resources in private goods, by increasing the total resources of commodities which can be supplied in positive amount by the group H 2 .
Non-triviality and irreducibility conditions are adapted from similar conditions in Chapter 2 of Florenzano (2003) .
A by-product of Proposition 5.2 is the following Lindahl-Foley equilibrium existence theorem:
Theorem 5.4. Under the assumptions A1-A6, NT, and IR, the economy E has a Lindahl-Foley
with a private goods price vector p = 0 and positive personalized price vectors for public goods, p
5.3. Decentralization in an infinite dimensional setting. In this subsection, as usual since Mas-Colell and Richard (1991) in an infinite dimensional setting, we make on the dual pair L, L ′ the following structural assumption:
SA: L is a linear vector lattice (or Riesz space) equipped with a Hausdorff locally convex linear topology τ such that • The positive cone L + is closed for the τ -topology of L;
• L ′ = (L, τ ) ′ , the topological dual of L for the topology τ (i.e. τ is compatible with the duality L, L ′ ) and L ′ is a vector sublattice of the order dual L ∼ of L.
5
It is worth noticing that it follows from Assumption SA that the commodity-price duality
H of the enlarged economy E ′ associated to E satisfies the same type of assumption.
The decentralization with prices of an Edgeworth equilibrium of E will be obtained under the following properness assumptions adapted from Tourky (1998 Tourky ( , 1999 .
A7:
If (x h ) h∈H , G is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E, then for each h ∈ H there exists a convex set
• (x h , G) + (ω, 0) is a τ -interior point of P h (x h , G). When Assumption A7 is satisfied, we say that preferences are (ω, 0)-proper at every component of a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E.
A8:
If (x h ) h∈H , G is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E and if ( h∈H (x h − ω h ), G) = f ∈F (y f , y Proof. Recall that in E ′ consumption and production sets are defined by and is an Edgeworth equilibrium consumption allocation of E ′ , actually, in view of Assumption A4, an element of its fuzzy core. Moreover, we deduce from Assumption A5 local non-satiation of preferences in E ′ at each component x h , (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0) .
We first prove that for each h ∈ H, there is a convex set P
In other words, we prove that each preference P ′ h is (ω, (0, . . . , 0) -proper at x ′ h = x h , (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0) .
6
To see this, define
